This paper studies specifications and proofs of distributed algorithms when only message history variables are used, using Basic Paxos and Multi-Paxos for distributed consensus as precise case studies. We show that not using and maintaining other state variables yields simpler specifications that are more declarative and easier to understand. It also allows easier proofs to be developed by needing fewer invariants and facilitating proof derivations. Furthermore, the proofs are mechanically checked more efficiently.
Introduction
Reasoning about correctness of distributed algorithms is notoriously difficult due to a number of reasons including concurrency, asynchronous networks, unbounded delay, and arbitrary failures. Emerging technologies like autonomous cars are bringing vehicular clouds closer to reality [10] , decentralized digital currencies are gathering more attention from academia and industry than ever [34] , and with the explosion in the number of nano-and pico-satellites being launched, a similar trend is expected in the field of space exploration as well [32] . All of these systems deal with critical resources like human life, currency, and intricate machinery. This only amplifies the need for employing formal methods to guarantee their correctness.
Verification of distributed algorithms continues to pose a demanding challenge to computer scientists, exacerbated by the fact that paper proofs of these algorithms cannot be trusted [36] . The usual line of reasoning in static analysis of such systems involves manually writing invariants and then using theorem provers to verify that the invariants follow from the specification and that they imply correctness. This paper. We first describe a systematic style to write specifications of distributed algorithms using message history variables. The only variables in these specifications are the sets of sent and received messages. We show (i) how these are different from the usual pseudocode, (ii) why these are sufficient for specifying all distributed algorithms, and (iii) when these are better for the provers than other specifications. A method is then explained which, given such specifications, allows us to systematically derive many important invariants which are needed to prove correctness. This method exploits the fact that the sets of sent and received messages grow monotonically -messages can only be added or read from these sets, not updated or deleted.
We use three existing specifications and their Safety proofs as our case studies: (i) Basic Paxos for single-valued consensus by Lamport et al., distributed as an example with the TLA + Proof System (TLAPS) [22] , (ii) Multi-Paxos for multi-valued consensus [3] , and (iii) Multi-Paxos with preemption [3] . Paxos is chosen because it is famous for being a difficult algorithm to grasp, while at the same time it is the core algorithm for distributed consensus-the most fundamental problem in distributed computing. We show that our approach led to significantly reduced sizes of specifications and proofs, numbers of needed manually written invariants, and proof checking times. Our specifications and proofs are available at https://github.com/sachand/HistVar. This paper is an extended version of [2] . The main extensions are added proof descriptions in Section 3 and complete, cleaned up specification, invariants, and proof in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details our style of writing specifications using Basic Paxos as an example. We then describe our strategy to systematically derive invariants in Section 3 while also showing how using history variables leads to needing fewer invariants. We discuss Multi-Paxos briefly in Section 4. Results comparing our specifications and proofs with those that do not use history variables are detailed in Section 5. Section 6 discusses related work and concludes.
Specifications using message history variables
We demonstrate our approach by developing a specification of Basic Paxos in which we only maintain the set of sent messages. This specification is made to correspond to the specification of Basic Paxos in TLA + written by Lamport et al. [22] . This is done intentionally to better understand the applicability of our approach. We also simultaneously show Lamport's description of the algorithm in English [19] to aid the comparison, except we rename message types and variable names to match those in his TLA + specification: prepare and accept messages are renamed 1a and 2a respectively, their responses are renamed 1b and 2b, respectively, and variable n is renamed b and bal in different places.
Distributed consensus. The basic consensus problem, called single-value consensus or single-decree consensus, is to ensure that at most a single value is chosen from among the values proposed by the processes. It is formally defined as
where V is the set of possible proposed values, and Chosen is a predicate that given a value v evaluates to true iff v was chosen by the algorithm. The specification of Chosen is part of the algorithm.
Basic Paxos. Paxos solves the problem of consensus. Two main roles of the algorithm are performed by two kinds of processes:
• P, the set of proposers that propose values that can be chosen.
• A, the set of acceptors that vote for proposed values. A value is chosen when there are enough votes for it.
A set Q of subsets of the acceptors, that is Q ⊆ 2 A , is used as a quorum system. It must satisfy the following properties:
• Q is a set cover for A -Q∈Q Q = A.
• Any two quorums overlap -∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q : Q1 ∩ Q2 = ∅.
The most commonly used quorum system takes any majority of acceptors as an element in Q. For example, if A = {1, 2, 3}, then the majority based quorum set is Q = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}. Quorums are needed because the system can have arbitrary failures. If a process waits for replies from all other processes, as in Two-Phase Commit, the system will hang in the presence of even one failed process. For instance, in the mentioned example, the system will continue to work even if acceptor 3 fails because at least one quorum, which is {1, 2}, is alive.
Basic Paxos solves the problem of single-value consensus. It defines predicate Chosen as
where B is the set of proposal numbers, also known as ballot numbers [18] , which is any set that can be strictly totally ordered. sent("2b", a, b, v ) means that a message of type 2b with ballot number b and value v was sent by acceptor a (to some set of processes). An acceptor votes by sending such a message.
The specifications presented in this paper are written in TLA + , an extension of the Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) [17] , a logic for specifying concurrent and distributed programs and reasoning about their properties. In TLA, a state is an instantiation of the variables of the program to values. An action is a relation between a current state and a new state, specifying the effect of executing a sequence of instructions. For example, the instruction x := x + 1 is represented in TLA and TLA + by the action x ′ = x + 1. An action is represented by a formula over unprimed and primed variables where unprimed variables refer to the values of the variables in the current state and primed variables refer to the values of the variables in the new state.
A program is specified by its actions and initial states. Formally, a program is specified as Spec Init ∧ ✷[Next] vars where Init is a predicate that holds for initial states of the program, Next is a disjunction of all the actions of the program, and vars is the tuple of all the variables. The expression [Next] vars is true if either Next is true, implying some action is true and therefore executed, or vars stutters, that is, the values of the variables are same in the current and new states. ✷ is the temporal operator always.
As a simple example, consider this specification of a clock based on Lamport's logical clock [16] but on a shared memory system:
The system has two processes numbered 0 and 1. 
Figure 1: Phase 1a of Basic Paxos specifies that process p updates its clock value to 1 greater than the higher of its and the other process' clock value. We define operator Max to obtain the highest of a set of values. choose denotes Hilbert's ǫ operator that returns some nondeterministically chosen term satisfying the body of the choose expression if it exists, otherwise an error is raised. • msgs-history variable maintaining the set of messages that have been sent. Processes read from or add to this set but cannot remove from it. We rename this to sent in both ours and Lamport et al.'s specifications for clarity purposes. This is the only variable maintained in our specifications.
• maxBal -for each acceptor, the highest ballot seen by it.
• maxVBal and maxVal -for each acceptor, maxVBal is the highest ballot in which it has voted, and maxVal is the value it voted for in that ballot.
Basic Paxos algorithm steps. The algorithm consists of repeatedly executing two phases. Each phase comprises two actions, one by acceptors and one by proposers.
• Phase 1a. Fig. 1 shows Lamport's description in English followed by Lamport et al.'s and our specifications in TLA + . Send is an operator that adds its argument to sent, i.e., Send (m) sent ′ = sent ∪ {m}.
1. The first conjunct in Lamport et al.'s specification is not mentioned in the English description and is not needed. Therefore it was removed.
2. The third conjunct is also removed because the only variable our specification maintains is sent, which is updated by Send .
• Phase 1b. Fig. 2 shows the English description and the specifications of Phase 1b. The first two conjuncts in both specifications capture the precondition in the English description. The remaining conjuncts specify the action.
1. The first conjunct states that message m received by acceptor a is of type 1a.
2. The second conjunct ensures that the proposal number bal in the 1a message m is higher than that of any 1a request responded to by a. In Lamport et al.'s specification, derived variable maxBal [a] maintains the highest proposal number that a has ever responded to, in 1b and 2b messages, and its second conjunct Phase 1b. If an acceptor receives a 1a request with number bal greater than that of any 1a request to which it has already responded, then it responds to the request with a promise not to accept any more proposals numbered less than bal and with the highest-numbered proposal (if any) that it has accepted. Lamport et al.'s Using sent only Phase1b(a ∈ A) ∃ m ∈ sent : . Using sent only, we capture this intent more directly, as ∀ m2 ∈ sent : m2.type ∈ {"1b", "2b"} ∧ m2.acc = a ⇒ m.bal > m2.bal , because those m2's are the response messages that a has ever sent.
3. The third conjunct is the action of sending a promise (1b message) not to accept any more proposals numbered less than bal and with the highest-numbered proposal (if any) that a has accepted, i.e., has sent a 2b message. This proposal is maintained in Lamport et al.'s specification in derived variables maxVBal and maxVal . We specify this proposal as max _prop(a), which is either the set of proposals that have the highest proposal number among all accepted by a or if a has not accepted anything, then {[bal → −1, val → ⊥]} as the default, where −1 / ∈ B and is smaller than all ballots and ⊥ / ∈ V. This corresponds to initialization in Lamport et al.'s specification as shown in Fig. 5 . Note that the specification in Appendix A writes ⊥ as None.
The remaining conjuncts in Lamport et al.'s specification maintain the variable maxBal [a].
A compiler that implements incrementalization [24] over queries would automatically generate and maintain such a derived variable to optimize the corresponding query.
• Phase 2a. Fig. 3 shows Phase 2a. The specifications differ from the English description by using a set of quorums, Q, instead of a majority. The only difference between the two specifications is the removed unchanged conjunct when using sent only. It is important to note that the English description fails to mention the first conjuncta conjunct without which the specification is unsafe. Every 2a message must have a unique ballot.
Note that the first conjunct in Lamport et al.'s specification (and therefore ours as well) states that none of the 2a messages sent so far has bal equal to b. This is not directly implementable in a real system because this quantification query requires accessing message histories of all processes. We leave this query as is for two main reasons: (i) The focus of this paper is to demonstrate the use of history variables against derived variables and compare them in the light of simpler specification and verification. This removes derived variables but leaves queries on history variables unchanged even though they are not directly implementable.
(ii) There is a commonly-used, straightforward, efficient way to implement this query -namely realizing ballot as a tuple in N × P [18] . So a proposer only executes Phase 2a on a ballot proposed by itself (i.e., sent a 1a message with that ballot) and, for efficient implementation, only executes Phase 2a on the highest ballot that it has proposed.
Phase 2a. If the proposer receives a response to its 1a requests (numbered b) from a majority of acceptors, then it sends a 2a request to each of those acceptors for a proposal numbered b with a value v , where v is the value of the highest-numbered proposal among the 1b responses, or is any value if the responses reported no proposals. • Phase 2b. Fig. 4 shows Phase 2b. Like Phase 1b, we replace the second conjunct with the corresponding query over sent and remove updates to the derived variables.
Overall Basic Paxos algorithm. To complete the algorithm specification, we define, and compare, vars, Init, Next, and Spec which are typical TLA + operator names for the set of variables, the initial state, possible actions leading to the next state, and the system specification, respectively, in Fig. 5 .
Lamport et al.'s initialization of maxVBal and maxVal to −1 and ⊥, respectively, is moved to our definition of max _prop in Fig. 2 . We do not need initialization of maxBal because if no 1b or 2b messages have been sent, the universally quantified queries over them would be vacuously true. In Lamport et al.'s specification, this is achieved by initializing maxBal to −1, which is smaller than all ballots, and thus, the conjunct m.bal > maxBal [a] in Fig. 2 holds for the first 1a message received.
Phase 2b. If an acceptor receives a 2a request for a proposal numbered bal, it accepts the proposal unless it has already responded to a 1a request having a number greater than bal .
Lamport et al.'s
Using sent only Phase2b(a ∈ A) ∃ m ∈ sent : The complete Basic Paxos algorithm specification is given in Appendix A. 
Invariants and proofs using message history variables
Invariants of a distributed algorithm can be categorized into the following three kinds:
1. Type invariants. These ensure that all data processed in the algorithm is of valid type.
For example, messages of type 1a must have a field bal ∈ B. If an action sends a 1a message with bal missing or bal / ∈ B, a type invariant is violated.
2. Message invariants. These are invariants defined on message history variables. For example, each message of type 2a has a unique bal . This is expressed by the invariant ∀ m1, m2 ∈ sent : m1.type = "2a" ∧ m2.type = "2a" ∧ m1.bal = m2.bal ⇒ m1 = m2.
3. Process invariants. These state properties about the data maintained in derived variables. For example, in Lamport et al.'s specification, one such invariant is that for any acceptor a, maxBal 
The complete invariants, auxiliary operators, and the safety property to be proved can be found in Appendix B.
Type invariants reduced to one. Lamport et al. define four type invariants, one for each variable they maintain. Messages is the set of all possible valid messages. We require only one, (I1). This invariant asserts that the type of all sent messages is valid. (I2-4) are not applicable to our specification.
Process invariants not needed. Lamport et al. define four process invariants, (I5-8), regarding variables maxVal , maxVBal , and maxBal . They are not applicable to our specification, and need not be given in our proof.
(I5) Because maxBal [a] is the highest ballot ever seen by a and maxVBal [a] is the highest ballot a has voted for, we have the following invariants:
where max(S ) choose e ∈ S ∪ {−1} : ∀ f ∈ S : e ≥ f . Note that max is not in TLA (I8) This states that a has not voted for any value at a ballot greater than maxVBal [a]. This invariant need not be manually given in our proofs because it is implied from the definition of maxVBal [a].
Message invariants not needed or more easily proved. Before detailing the message invariants, we present a systematic method that can derive several useful invariants used by Lamport et al. and thus make the proofs easier. This method is based on the following properties of our specifications and distributed algorithms:
1. sent grows monotonically, that is, the only operations on it are read and add.
2. Message invariants hold for each sent message of some type, i.e., they are of the form ∀ m ∈ sent : m.type = τ ⇒ Φ(m), or more conveniently if we define sent τ = {m ∈ sent : m.type = τ }, we have ∀ m ∈ sent τ : Φ(m).
3. sent = ∅ initially, so the message invariants are vacuously true in the initial state of the system.
4. Distributed algorithms usually implement a logical clock for ordering two arbitrary messages. In Paxos, this is done by ballots.
We demonstrate our method by deriving (I15). The method is applied for each message type used in the algorithm. Invariant (I15) is about 2b messages. We first identify all actions that send 2b messages and then do the following:
1. Increment. 2b messages are sent in Phase 2b as specified in Fig. 4 . We first determine the increment to sent, ∆(sent), the new messages sent in Phase 2b. We denote a message in ∆(sent) by δ for brevity. We have, from Fig. 4 ,
2. Analyze. We deduce properties about the messages in ∆(sent). For 2b messages, we deduce the most straightforward property that connects the contents of messages in ∆(sent) with the message m, from Fig. 4 ,
3. Integrate. Because (i) sent monotonically increases, and (ii) φ is an existential quantification over sent, φ holds for all increments to sent 2b . Property (i) means that once the existential quantification in φ holds, it holds forever. Integrating both sides of Equation (6) in the space of 2b messages yields (I15), i.e.,
The case for φ being universally quantified over sent is discussed with invariant (I12).
Other message invariants. (I9) and (I10) follow directly from Equation (4) and need not be manually specified for our proof. We also derive (I11), (I12), and (I14) as described in the following.
(I11) Like (I15), (I11) can also be systematically derived, from our Phase 1b in Fig. 2 . This invariant is less obvious when variables maxVal and maxVBal are explicitly used and updated because (i) they are not updated in the same action that uses them, requiring additional invariants to carry their meaning to the proofs involving the actions that use them, and (ii) it is not immediately clear if these variables are being updated in Lamport et al.'s Phase 2b in Fig. 4 because a 2b message is being sent or because a 2a message was received.
(I12) To derive (I11) and (I15), we focused on where the contents of the new message come from. For (I12), we analyze why those contents were chosen. From our Phase 1b with definitions of 2bs and max _prop in Fig. 2 , we have
φ has two disjuncts-the first has a universal quantification and the second has negated existential, which is universal in disguise. If sent is universally quantified, integration like for (I15) is not possible because the quantification only holds at the time of the action. As new messages are sent in the future, the universal may become violated.
The key is the phrase at the time. One way to work around the universal is to add a time field in each message and update it in every action as a message is sent, like using a logical clock. Then, a property like φ(δ) = ∀ m ∈ sent τ : ψ(m) can be integrated to obtain
Because ballots act as the logical clock in Paxos, we do not need to specify a separate logical clock and we can perform the above integration on Equation (8) to obtain the invariant (I12).
(I14) This invariant is of the form ∀ m1, m2 ∈ sent τ , t : ψ(m1, t)∧ψ(m2, t) ⇒ m1 = m2. In this case, ψ(m, t) m.bal = t. Deriving invariants like (I14) is nontrivial unless ψ is already known. In some cases, ψ can be guessed. The intuition is to look for a universal quantification (or negated existential) in the specification of an action. The ideal case is when the quantification is on the message type being sent in the action. Potential candidates for ψ may be hidden in such quantifications. Moreover, if message history variables are used, these quantifications are easier to identify.
Starting with a guess of ψ, we identify the change in the counting measure (cardinality) of the set {t : m ∈ sent τ ∧ ψ(m, t)} along with that of sent τ . In the case of (I14), we look for ∆(|{m.bal : m ∈ sent 2a }|). From our Phase 2a in Fig. 3 , we have
Rewriting φ as {b} ⊆ {m.bal : m ∈ sent 2a }, it becomes clear that ∆(|{m.bal : m ∈ sent 2a }|) = 1. Meanwhile, ∆(|{m ∈ sent 2a }|) = 1. Because the counting measure increases by the same amount for both, (I14) can be derived safely.
TLAPS. The proofs presented in this paper are written and checked in TLA + Proof System (TLAPS), a tool that mechanically checks proofs of properties of systems specified in TLA + . Proofs are written in a hierarchical style [20] , and are transformed to individual proof obligations that are sent to backend theorem provers. The primary backend provers are Isabelle and Zenon, with the SMT solvers CVC3, Z3, veriT, and Yices as backups. Temporal formulas are proved using LS4, a PTL (Propsitional Temporal Logic) prover. Users can specify which prover they want to use by using its name and can specify the timeout for each obligation separately.
As an example, we present the proof of a simple type invariant about the clock specification in (3) -It is always the case that c ∈ [{0, 1} → N]:
The proof of theorem Inv is written in a hierarchical fashion. It is proved by two steps, named 1 1 and 1 2, and RuleINV1 by Lamport [17] . Proof steps in TLAPS are typically written as: Basic Paxos Proof. The main property to prove is Safety, defined as follows:
To proceed, we first define Inv and prove Inv ⇒ Safe. We then prove Spec ⇒ ✷Inv and, by temporal logic, conclude Spec ⇒ ✷Safe. Note that property Safety is called Consistent, and invariant Safe is called Consistency by Lamport et al. [22] .
To prove the Safe property for the algorithm, we first prove the following helper lemmas for three important properties: holds:
2. Lemma VotedOnce. If acceptor a1 votes pair v 1, b and acceptor a2 votes pair v 2, b , then v 1 = v 2:
3. Lemma SafeAtStable. If pair v , b is safe in the current state, it remains safe in the next state, where state transition is defined by Next.
The proof of Spec ⇒ ✷Inv follows the same strategy used in Chand et al. [3] . The proof is inductive, written in a hierarchical style [20] . The base case proves Init ⇒ Inv . The inductive case considers each action in Next individually, and proves that Inv holds in the next state given that it holds in the current state.
The complete proof for Basic Paxos spans about 2 pages, and is summarized as follows:
1. Helper lemmas and their proofs are about half a page. This includes proofs for lemmas VotedInv , VotedOnce, and SafeAtStable.
The proof of type invariant
TypeOK is a quarter page, using only a 1-level proof for each action.
3. The proof of message invariant MsgInv is less than a page, using 1-level proofs for actions Phase1a, Phase1b, and Phase2b, taking less than a half a page altogether, and a 4-level proof for Phase2a, taking half a page.
4. The proof of theorem Safety using Spec ⇒ ✷Inv is a quarter page, with a straightforward argument of Inv ⇒ Safe.
The complete TLAPS-checked proof is given in Appendix C.
Multi-Paxos
Multi-Paxos specification. We have developed new specifications of Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption that use only message history variables, by removing derived variables from the specifications described in Chand et al. [3] . This is done in a way similar to how we removed derived variables from Lamport et al.'s specification of Basic Paxos. The most interesting action here was preemption. With preemption, if an acceptor receives a 1a or 2a message with bal smaller than the highest that it has seen, it responds with a preempt message that contains the highest ballot seen by the acceptor. Upon receiving such a message, the receiving proposer would pick a new ballot that is higher than the ballots of all received preempt messages. This is a good opportunity to introduce the other message history variable, received , the set of all messages received. It is different from sent because a message could be delayed indefinitely before being received, if at all. In [3] , derived variable proBallot is introduced to maintain the result of this query on received messages. We contrast this with our new specification in Fig. 7 . Receive(m) adds message m to received , i.e., Receive(m) received ′ = received ∪ {m}.
Multi-Paxos proof. While we observed a 27% decrease in proof size for Basic Paxos, for Multi-Paxos this decrease was 48%. Apart from the points described in Section 3, an Chand et al. [3] Using sent and received Table 1 • The total number of manually written invariants decreased by 54% overall-by 9 (60%) from 15 to 6 for Basic Paxos, by 8 (50%) from 16 to 8 for Multi-Paxos, and by 9 (53%) from 17 to 8 for Multi-Paxos with Preemption. This drastic decrease is because we do not maintain the variables maxBal , maxVBal , and maxVal as explained in Section 3.
Results
• * indicates a number for the specification and proof in Appendices A and C respectively, after removing unnecessary line breaks from default latex generated by TLA + Tools. † 1b invariants are (I10)-(I12), 2a invariants are (I13) and (I14), and 2b invariants are (I9) and (I15) for Basic Paxos in Figure 6 , and corresponding ones for Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption in [3] . An obligation is a condition that TLAPS checks. Check time is on an Intel i7-4720HQ 2.6 GHz CPU with 16 GB of memory, running 64-bit Windows 10 Home (v1709 b16299.98) and TLAPS 1.5.4. ** indicates that TLAPS 1.5.4 failed to check and gave up after that number of seconds.
besides sent. This decrease is 468 lines (47%), from 988 to 520, for Multi-Paxos, and is 494 lines (48%), from 1032 to 538 for Multi-Paxos with Preemption.
• Proof by contradiction is used twice in the proof by Lamport et al. and thrice for the proofs in Chand et al. We were able to remove all of these because our specification uses queries as opposed to derived variables. The motive behind removing proofs by contradiction is to have easier to understand constructive proofs.
• The total number of proof obligations decreased by 46% overall-by 57 (24%) from 239 to 182 for Basic Paxos, by 450 (49%) from 918 to 468 for Multi-Paxos, and by 468 (49%) from 959 to 491 for Multi-Paxos with Preemption.
• The proof-checking time decreased by 11 seconds (26%), from 42 to 31 for Basic Paxos. For Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption, TLAPS took over 3 minutes for the proofs in [3] and failed (due to updates in the new version of TLAPS) to check the proofs of about 5 obligations. In contrast, our proofs were able to be checked completely in 1.5 minutes or less.
6 Related work and conclusion
History variables. History variables have been at the center of much debate since they were introduced in the early 1970s [7, 6, 8] . Owicki and Gries [28] use them in an effort to prove properties of parallel programs, criticized by Lamport in his writings [14] . Contrary to ours, their history variables were ghost or auxiliary variables introduced for the sole purpose of simpler proofs. Our history variables are sent and received , whose contents are actually processed in all distributed system implementations. Recently, Lamport and Merz [21] present rules to add history variables, among other auxiliary variables, to a low-level specification so that a refinement mapping from a high-level one can be established. The idea is to prove invariants in the high-level specification that serves as an abstraction of the low-level specification. In contrast, we focus on high-level specifications because our target executable language is DistAlgo, and efficient lower-level implementations can be generated systematically from high-level code.
Specification and verification. A number of systems [33, 9, 5] , models [35, 4, 27] , and methods [29, 12, 13, 1] have been developed in the past to specify distributed algorithms and mechanically check proofs of the safety and liveness properties of the algorithms. This work is orthogonal to them in the sense that the idea of maintaining only message history variables can be incorporated in their specifications as well.
Closer to our work in terms of the specification is the work by Padon et al. [29] , which does not define any variable and instead defines predicate relations which would correspond to manipulations of our history variables. For example, Send ([type → "1a", bal → b]) is denoted by start_round _msg(b). Instead of using TLA + , the temporal logic of actions, they specify Paxos in first-order logic to later exploit benefits of Effectively Propositional Logic, such as satisfiability being decidable in it.
In contrast, we present a method to specify distributed algorithms using history variables, implementable in high-level executable languages like DistAlgo, and then show (i) how such specifications require fewer invariants for proofs and (ii) how several important invariants can be systematically derived.
Conclusion.
We have shown that using message history variables can lead to simpler specifications and easier proofs of challenging distributed algorithms. Future work includes applying our method in specification and proofs of other complex distributed algorithms, and extending our method for proving liveness properties. 
Phase 1a: A 1a message with ballot b is sent by some proposer (to all processes).
Phase 1b: For an acceptor a, if there is a 1a message m with ballot m.bal that is higher than the highest it has seen, a sends a 1b message with m.bal alongwith the highest-numbered pair it has voted for. Phase 2b: For an acceptor a, if there is a 2a message m with ballot m.bal that is higher than or equal to the highest it has seen, a sends a 2b message with m.bal and m.val .
Phase2b(a)
∃ m ∈ sent : ∧ m.type = "2a" ∧ ∀ m2 ∈ sent : m2.type ∈ {"1b", "2b"} ∧ m2.acc = a ⇒ m.bal ≥ m2.bal 
